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Abstract 
While the public good experiment has been used to analyze cooperation among various 
groups in Western Europe and North America, it has not been extensively used in other 
contexts such as Turkey.  This project seeks to rectify that and explore how Turkish 
university students informally self govern.  By employing the public good experiment 
among a cohort of students attending universities in İzmir, Turkey and Adıyaman, 
Turkey, we hope to quantitatively analyze the factors which lead to altruistic punishment, 
to antisocial punishment, and ultimately to enhanced cooperation in Turkish society. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Most economic decisions lie beyond the control of just one individual.  Rather, a smooth 
functioning economy requires trust and cooperation between separate individual entities 
who are often anonymous parties.  Traditional economic theory tells us that somehow 
these individual entities are able to effortlessly make utility-maximizing decisions which 
are both completely rational and also fully account for all possible externalities.  Theory 
leads us to believe that this alchemy of economic agents seeking their own self-interest 
ultimately leads to the optimal allocation of scarce resources.   
 
Experimental economics is able to explore trust and cooperation in anonymous 
economic interactions, as well as the tenuous equilibrium which exists balancing 
cooperators and noncooperators together.  Multilateral cooperation problems can be 
modeled in public goods games in which participants individually make decisions about 
their level of cooperation independent of the choices of other participants.  Experimental 
results have identified a variety of factors that enhance and discourage cooperation.  These 
experimental results have helped to distinguish between the behavior of actual human 
beings and that of idealized human beings found in traditional economic theory. 
Further refinement has occurred as economists have broadened the populations 
included in these experiments.  Great variety exists in the ways people of various 
backgrounds, various positions in society, and various cultures make decisions in these 
public goods game experiments.  One area where this diversity is strongly seen is in the 
aggregate differences between developed and developing countries including Russia, 
former Soviet countries, and the countries of the Muslim world.   
A few explanations have been given for these differences – weakness of the rule of 
law, weak norms of civic cooperation, etc – but these differences have not been explored in 
significant detail (Herrmann et al. 2008).  Furthermore, these explanations are limited to 
exploring the differences in between various societies.  An area ripe for exploration is the 
diversity of behavior within these societies with an emphasis on determining whether 
there are individual characteristics which distinguish cooperative participants from free 
loaders.  Understanding the diversity of behavior as well as the distinguishing 
characteristics between cooperative participants and free loaders enables evolutionary 
economics to further understand the structure and growth of the economy. 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine trust and cooperation within Turkey 
through the public goods game and to attempt to identify individual characteristics which 
distinguish cooperative participants from free loaders.  In order to capture geographical 
and cultural variations of cooperatıon levels among Turkish university students, two 
different locations were selected (Izmir in the West and Adiyaman in the East).  The 
fieldwork was completed during May 2010.  The project was support by a grant from 
Izmir University of Economic’s Office of Scientific Research. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The second section discusses the related 
literature. The generality of public goods games, the contributions of experimental 
economics onto the analysis of public goods games, and the significance of punishment are 
some of the topics covered by the second section. In the third section the background 
information and the details of experiments conducted in İzmir and Adıyaman are 





2. Related Literature 
Cooperation and trust are essential components of a healthy, functioning 
economy.  As life becomes more and more interdependent our even seemingly anonymous 
and trivial interactions with one another increase in significance.  On an interpersonal 
level, cooperation and trust ensure that our business relationships and interactions 
function.  Contracts are unable to contain provisions for every possibility.  At some point, 
one must take a leap of faith and believe that the other party will make good on their 
commitment.  Without this mutual trust and cooperation, individuals in society would be 
paralyzed and unable to move forward.  Nonetheless, examples of broken trust and non-
cooperation are unfortunately common.  When a system leaves room to be manipulated, 
people tend to take advantage of it.  A question economists and public policy makers seek 
to answer is how society should best react to and work to reduce these instances of broken 
trust and non-cooperation. 
Beyond the interpersonal level, there are societal and even global issues that 
require deep levels of cooperation and trust between multiple parties to solve.  Examples 
of multilateral issues requiring trust and cooperation abound and include such issues as 
global warming, climate change, and environmental protection; public resource 
management of fisheries, forests, and grazing land; collective action including support of 
charities, product boycotts, and labor relations including strikes; functional governance 
including tax compliance, voting, and neighborhood/park safety and cleanliness; 
teamwork in instances like collective hunting, warfare, and sports; and so on.  Each of 
these instances requires cooperation for progress. 
As demonstrated by the recent strikes in Greece over the newly adopted austerity 
measures, cooperation and trust in our governments is quite important and a lack of it can 
paralyze a country leading to unfortunate results.  Throughout Izmir there are several 
reminders of the importance of cooperation and trust.  Signaling the importance of 
cooperation on the city level, the Izmir Büyükşehir Belediyesi (the greater Izmir 
Municipality) put up billboards this spring with the words, “Birlikte Güçlüyüz,” which 
mean “Together We are Strong” and encourage residents of Izmir to cooperate for the 
good of the community.  Likewise, the Izmir building of the Central Bank of Turkey 
building has the words, “Vergi Kalkınmanın Temelidir,” which mean, “Taxes are the 
Foundation of Development,” and is intended to encourage people to support the 
development of Turkey by paying their taxes.  All these examples show that cooperation 
or lack thereof has significant impact on society for good or for bad.   
Having established that cooperation is important on both a micro and a macro 
level in society in general and in the economy in particular, it is important to study 
cooperation and trust.  What factors facilitate it?  What hinders it?  What are the economic 
benefits of cooperation or costs of a lack thereof?  Does cooperation look the same 
everywhere or are there cultural variations to it?  How can policy makers encourage 
cooperation and how can individuals seek it out in their relationships?  While it may be 
easy to solicit opinions about these questions, it’s much more difficult to study these 
questions in an empirical way.  Fortunately, for researchers an economic tool exists to 
study just these issues:  the public goods game. 
Simply, a public goods game involves a group of people each with his or her own 
endowment who decide simultaneously to contribute it, or a portion of it, into a group 
project.  Whatever is invested in the group project is multiplied by a fixed growth factor 
and then returned in equal proportions to all the group members regardless of their initial 
contribution to the project and added to whatever remains of each member’s original 
endowment.  The growth factor is set such that the return from each unit invested in the group project to the individual is less than one, but the returns to the individual when all 
group members have invested together into the group project are greater than one.  In this 
way, it is always in one’s interest to not contribute to the group project.  However, the 
growth unit is set such that if everyone were to invest into the group project then everyone 
would receive more than they had put in.   
Consider for example the situation when there are four members in a group each 
of whom receives an endowment of 20 units and the growth factor is set at 0.4.  Ayşe could 
choose to contribute no units to the group project.  If her other three group members 
choose likewise not to contribute to the group project, then Ayşe would receive nothing 
from the group project and would end the period with the original 20 units left in her 
endowment (as would the other members of her group).  If instead her other three group 
members were to contribute their entire endowments (a group total of 60 units) to the 
group project, then Ayşe would receive 24 units from the group project (the group total of 
60 units multiplied by the growth factor of 0.4) in addition to the 20 units left in her 
endowment for a total of 44 units.  Her other three group mates having contributed their 
entire endowments to the group project would receive a total of 24 units each all from the 
group project.   
Now consider the opposite situation where Ayşe contributes all her 20 units into 
the group project.  If no other group members contributes to the group project, then Ayşe 
would end the period with a total of 8 units all of which she would receive from the group 
project (the group total of 20 units multiplied by the growth factor of 0.4) having 
contributed her entire endowment in the group project.  In contrast her group members 
would each add 8 units they received from the group project to the 20 units left in their 
endowments for a total of 28 units each.  Finally, if Ayşe as well as her three other group 
members each contributed their entire endowments of 20 units to the group project then 
they would each receive 32 units from the project (the group total of 80 units multiplied by 
the growth factor of 0.4). 
As can be seen in this example, Ayşe is always better not contributing anything to 
the group project.  If no one else contributes, the 20 units Ayşe chooses not to contribute to 
the group project would be greater than the 8 units she would receive had she fully 
contributed her entire endowment to the group project.  Likewise, if everyone else 
contributes the maximum amount in the project, the 44 units Ayşe receives by not 
contributing anything to the project would be greater than the 32 units she would have 
received had she fully contributed her endowment to the group project.  One point to be 
aware of:  while Ayşe’s individual total is maximized when everyone else, but her fully 
contributes to the group project; the groups total is maximized when everyone fully 
contributes to the group project (116 units vs. 132 units).  In this instance of complete 
group cooperation the maximum wealth is created.  Even though the group as a whole 
does best when everyone invests the maximum amount in the project, Ayşe’s dominant 
strategy, in the language of game theory, is to never contribute in the group project and 
the Nash equilibrium of a public goods game is for there to be no contributions by any 
group member to the group project. 
The public goods game is able to model multilateral cooperation problems as 
individuals simultaneously and independently make contribution choices.  The public 
goods game forces participants to act in an entirely self-interest way by keeping one’s 
endowment and not contributing anything to the group project or in a cooperative, group-
interested way  by contributing from one’s endowment to the group project.  Through the 
decisions made in public goods games by participants, experimental economists are able to 
further study more fully the ephemeral characteristics of trust and cooperation.  
Researchers are able to explore these characteristics through various modifications to the 
treatments of these games and through analysis of individual performance together with survey/questionnaire responses.  Public goods games are a tool that enables economists to 
study trust and cooperation not in vitro as is done in theoretical work, but rather in vivo in 
real world performance of participants. 
The in vivo real world performance of participants has overall proven to be 
different, at least in initial periods of play, than what the Nash equilibrium for a public 
goods game implies.  General observations are that most people contrary to the dominant 
strategy choose to contribute a fairly significant portion of their endowment to the group 
project.  While initial contributions to the group project start higher than expected, over 
time the level of contributions decrease.  This decrease in contribution over time has been 
explained as the response of conditional cooperators to the behavior free riders.  Free 
riders are those participants who do not contribute to the group project, but share in its 
benefits.  In addition to these general observations, a variety of additional studies have 
identified factors that enhance, discourage, or have no effect on contribution. 
Gachter and Herrmann (2008) conducted an extensive review of the literature and 
identified the factors that most significantly effect contribution levels.  Factors that increase 
contributions to the public goods games are reputation effects, repeated encounters, 
multiple periods of play with the same group members, communication, and a higher 
group project growth multiplier (although this change in multiplier does not alter the 
dominant strategy of non-contribution).  Anonymity, one-shot play, perpetually changing 
group membership, and a lack of communication all tend to discourage contribution.  It 
does not appear that group size has a significant impact on contribution behavior.  These 
findings will be further examined below. 
Reputation effects occur when behavior is directly associated with the one who 
exhibits it.  When play is anonymous and group members don’t know with whom they are 
playing, contributions are lower.  In contrast, when group member identities are common 
knowledge, contributions increase (Gachter and Fehr 1999).  These reputation effects play 
out most when there is some degree of group identity which acts ”like a ’lubricant’ that 
makes social exchange effective.”  Reputation effects have also been seen in other research 
regarding cooperative behavior (even when reputation effect is implied) (Andreoni and 
Petrie 2004; Haley and Fessler 2005; Semmann et al. 2005; and Milinski et al. 2002). 
The frequency of game play – whether the game is a one-shot encounter or a 
repeated series of encounters – also significantly effects the contribution levels of the 
participants.  The benefits of repeated play are further enhanced when group members 
remain the same in consecutive rounds of play (Fehr and Gachter 2000; Sonnemens et al. 
1999).  However, even group composition randomization throughout the successive 
rounds of play did not entirely negate the positive effects gained by repeated interactions.  
A somewhat unexpected observation is that contributions are still present beyond a 
superficial level even in one-shot, non-repeated encounters where there is seemingly no 
reason for one to cooperate (Gachter and Herrman 2010).  In spite of the anonymity of 
these interactions, reputation effects – even though reputation is only known to one’s own 
self – are nonetheless strong enough to lead to increased contribution levels. 
Finally, one of the factors that most significantly increases the level of contribution 
in public goods games is the ability for group members to communicate with one another 
during play (Ostrom et al. 1992; Brosig et al. 2003; and Charness and Dufwenberg 2006).  
As participants communicate with one another, they are able to coordinate their actions 
before the game begins and express appreciation (or disappointment) after the game 
concludes.  The research implies that individuals in these games tend to prefer the 
avoidance of guilt to the receipt of praise. 
Regardless of the factors that significantly impact contribution levels, research has 
shown that over additional rounds of anonymous play contributions to the group project 
often decrease sometimes entirely.  This phenomenon has been explained by the theory that most people are conditional cooperators (Kelley and Stahelski 1970; Dufwenberg et al. 
2006; and Gachter and Herrmann 2010).  A conditional cooperator is a person who is 
willing to cooperate – in this case by contributing to a group project – so long as the other 
participants in the group are also cooperating.  When everyone cooperates there is a 
positive feedback loop which can maintain high levels of contributions.  However, when 
conditional cooperators are in the same group as free loaders, the free loaders lack of 
contribution (and equal share of the group project benefits) decreases the willingness of 
conditional cooperators to contribute to the group project.   
Fischbacher et al. undertook a study in 2001 to determine what proportion of the 
population are conditional cooperators versus free riders.  According to their study of 44 
Swiss university students, the population was made up of roughly half conditional 
cooperators, a third free riders, and with the remaining classified as nontraditional 
participants.  Whether these proportions are unique to Swiss students or are similar 
elsewhere is an interesting question for future research.  Öneş and Putterman conducted a 
similar study in 2005 grouping participants by type – top cooperators in one group, free 
loaders in another, etc – and discovered that indeed group outcomes are predicated on 
group type and that when grouped together top cooperators achieve near ideal results. 
In light of the prevalence of free riders is there then no hope for increasing (or 
even sustaining) levels of cooperation in public goods games?  Research has shown us a 
potential solution:  introducing a punishment treatment.  Such a treatment enables group 
members to punish one another.  In a typical punishment treatment, punishment is costly 
to both the punisher and the punished.  The punisher pays a fee for each punishment unit, 
that is for every punishment unit a punisher gives the total number of his or her own units 
decrease by one unit.  Meanwhile, for each punishment unit the punished person receives, 
his or her total units are reduced (often by a multiple of the punishment units received).  
When researchers introduce a punishment treatment to public goods games, they find that 
cooperation is prevented from deteriorating.  Not only is the punishment treatment a 
stopgap which prevents the deterioration of contribution levels, in certain circumstances 
over time the punishment treatment even leads to increased levels of contribution 
(Yamagishi 1986; Ostrom et al. 1992; and Fehr and Gachter 2000). 
As is expected, punishment is used across the board to punish free riders.  When 
the punishment treatment is introduced in a common goods game conditional cooperators 
have an alternative response to free riders (Herrmann et al. 2008).  Whereas previously, 
conditional cooperators could either endure unmerited rewarding of free riders by 
choosing to continue to contribute to the group project or alternatively they could choose 
retain more of their endowment by reducing their own contributions to the group project.  
As was explained above, conditional cooperators in groups containing free riders 
eventually reduce their contributions to zero.  With the introduction of the punishment 
treatment, conditional cooperators have a new option of continuing to cooperate while at 
the same time being able to express their dissatisfaction with free riders through costly 
punishment, which negatively impacts the unmerited returns of free riders. 
The punishment treatment increases and/or stabilizes cooperation at higher levels 
than would be expected in a treatment without punishment (Boyd et al. 2003).  This is an 
especially interesting finding, because evolutionary theorists had previously theorized that 
such “altruistic punishment” would not be present in large groups of nonrelatives.  
Whereas one might incur a personal cost for the benefit of a group of one’s kin, previous 
theories concluded that individuals would not choose to engage in similar costly activity 
when the primary beneficiaries were a large group of nonrelated people.  That altruistic 
punishment exists even in large groups of nonrelatives indicates that something beyond 
evolutionary self-preservation is at play. Altruistic punishment is able to create a positive feedback loop whereby 
punishment of free riders leads to increased contributions over repeated interactions (Fehr 
and Gachter 2000; Masclet et al. 2003).  Wondering whether it was just the adverse 
monetary consequences of punishment that led to increased contributions, Masclet et al. 
offered participants in another treatment the opportunity to assign a “non-monetary” 
punishment unit at no personal cost.  They discovered that even a “non-monetary” 
punishment unit led to an increase in overall group contributions, although, not as 
significant or lasting an increase as monetary punishment did. 
While altruistic punishment looks to be an ideal solution to the free rider problem 
in public goods games, the reality is more complicated.  It is true that punishment 
treatments lead to stabilized and sometimes increased contributions.  However, it is 
important to remember that punishment is costly, that is punishment comes at a price.  
Usually public goods games last for no more than ten periods and in that duration the 
monetary costs of punishments, both the costs incurred by assigning punishment and the 
punishment costs themselves to received by the punished, are greater than the increased 
contributions that punishment encourages (Fehr and Gachter 2000).  Overall, punishment 
results in net losses, at least in games with limited numbers of periods, and therefore is not 
a very efficient way of increasing contributions.  Herrmann et al. conducted public goods 
games in sixteen different countries in a study in 2008 and in thirteen of the sixteen 
countries participants accumulated less points in the punishment treatment than in the 
non-punishment treatment.  In order for punishment to be an efficient means of increasing 
group wealth, an important equilibrium needs to be realized between punishment’s 
cooperation enhancing effects and wealth destroying costs. 
Over a long enough time frame punishment does become an effective.  While 
punishment is not effective at enhancing cooperation in most public goods games which 
last for no more than ten periods, as the number of periods of play increase so does the 
effectiveness of punishment.  When the number of periods was expanded to fifty, 
punishment was found to be an efficient way to enhance participant contributions and 
overall cooperation increased compared to a non-punishment treatment (Gachter et al 
2008).  Beyond laboratory experiments, there is no reason to think that in real life situations 
altruistic punishment, while certainly costly especially at first, wouldn’t reap dividends 
over the long term as well. 
A natural question to ask is what exactly is it that punishment is doing.  How does 
altruistic punishment lead to increased contribution and cooperation?  Masclet et al. (2003) 
propose that punishment is effective for two reasons:  (1) participants realize that 
punishment can make free-riding unprofitable and therefore, seeking to maximize their 
individual payoffs, former free riders increase their contributions in an act of self-interest 
and/or (2) punishment is a way of communicating in an environment where otherwise 
communication is not allowed and this communication leads to increased contributions.  
Participants are able to express through their assignment of punishment points (or lack 
thereof) their feelings about other group members’ levels of participation.  This expression 
of feelings through the assignment of punishment points can in turn cause the recipient to 
feel of shame for being labeled as a free rider.  Those who were shamed through the 
receipt of punishment points might then be motivated to make larger contributions in the 
following rounds in an effort to reduce one’s shame and increase one’s reputation.  In a 
sense, peer pressure is activated through the punishment treatment and this motivates 
participants to behave more cooperatively (Kandel and Lazear 1992). 
While punishment is primarily used altruistically as a tool to punish those who 
contribute less than average to the group project, group members are not restricted to 
using punishment in this way.  It turns out that punishment is a double-edged sword.  
Sometimes punishment is used for reasons other than punishing free rider.  Consider for example the situation where one resident of an apartment complex goes above and beyond 
the call of duty to clean the stairwell.  Normally such an individual would be appreciated 
or even rewarded for her efforts.  However, it is conceivable that such an individual would 
instead be punished.  It’s not difficult to imagine an especially persnickety resident who in 
lieu of gratitude creates a mess in front of our good Samaritan’s door.  Whether out of 
shame or aggressiveness or something else, this persnickety resident has anti-socially 
punished the good Samaritan resident. 
We see this same phenomenon in public goods games when those who contribute 
less than average to the group project punish those who contribute more than average.  
While such behavior might be some sort of non-rational idiosyncrasy, another explanation 
might be that perhaps the punisher is using punishment as a means to retaliate against 
previously received punishments (Nikiforakis 2007).  While post hoc theories about the 
motivation of anti-social punishment certainly do exist, an interesting research topic 
would be to investigate punishment motivations in real time.  Whereas the punishment of 
free riding generally increases cooperation, this anti-social punishment of high 
contributors generally has the opposite effect and reduces cooperation.  Furthermore, 
when extensive opportunities exist to avenge received sanctions over several rounds of 
punishment, contributions decrease and there are net losses (Denant-Boemont et al. 2007). 
Anti-social punishment was observed prevalently in a cross-cultural study 
conducted by Herrmann et al. in 16 different participant pools in 2008.  Similar levels of 
altruistic punishment of free riders was observed throughout all the various participant 
pools.  However great diversity existed in the extent to which the various participant pools 
engaged in anti-social punishment.  As was written earlier, punishment didn’t always 
enhance outcomes (in thirteen of the countries in the Herrmann study, participants 
accumulated less points in the punishment treatment than in the non-punishment 
treatment).  Figure 1 below geographically illustrates the participant pools where anti-
social punishment was most prevalent.   
Figure 1:  Prevalence of Anti-Social Punishment (Herrmann et al. 2008) 
 
This map was created using Google Maps and ZeeMaps. 
The blue pins indicate participant pools where punishment was predominantly 
altruistic with limited amounts of anti-social punishment.  The red pins indicate pools 
where in addition to altruistic punishment, anti-social punishment was observed with 
significant frequency.  It should be noted that the blue pins are located primarily in developed, western countries home to the majority of public goods games research.  Anti-
social punishment was much more prevalent in non-Western, developing countries 
(countries in which previous public goods game research had not been conducted).  
Potentially, the countries where the majority of public goods game research has been 
conducted might be the exception and not the norm of typical punishment behavior. 
Herrmann et al. went on to econometrically analyze the punishment behavior 
(both altruistic and anti-social) on a societal level with criteria commonly used by social 
scientists in the classification of countries.  They found that strong norms of civic 
cooperation in a country are associated with more stringent punishment of free riders and 
that anti-social punishment was significantly correlated with weak norms of civic 
cooperation and weakness of the rule of law.  Norms of civic cooperation and weakness of 
the rule of law explain the variations on a cross-cultural level, but variations of 
punishment behavior on an individual level are left unexplained.   
A study conducted in 2004 by Gachter et al. in rural and urban Russia – one of the 
countries identified in the Herrmann et al. study which had a significant level of anti-social 
punishment – compared individual participants’ socio-economic background as well as 
certain measurements of trust with their performance in a public goods game.  On an 
individual level, Gachter et al. attempted to see whether these criteria explained 
contribution behavior in two one-shot public goods games (one with and one without a 
punishment treatment).  They found that contribution behavior was not directly impacted 
by socio-economic background, but instead was significantly impacted by trust attitudes 
which were in turn influenced by socio-economic background.  Furthermore, three trust 
attitude variables (GSS Fair, GSS Trust, and Trust Strangers, to be explained in more detail 
later) were shown to significantly impact contribution behavior. 
 
3.  The Background 
Cooperation and trust are essential components of a healthy, functioning 
economy.  As life becomes more and more interdependent, our even seemingly 
anonymous and trivial interactions with one another increase in significance.  On an 
interpersonal level, cooperation and trust ensure that our business relationships and 
interactions function.  Contracts are unable to contain provisions for every possibility.  At 
some point, one must take a leap of faith and believe that the other party will make good 
on their commitment.  Without this mutual trust and cooperation, individuals in society 
would be paralyzed and unable to move forward.  Nonetheless, examples of broken trust 
and non-cooperation are unfortunately common.  When a system leaves room to be 
manipulated, people tend to take advantage of it.  A question economists and public policy 
makers seek to answer is how society should best react to and work to reduce these 
instances of broken trust and non-cooperation. 
Beyond the interpersonal level, there are societal and even global issues that 
require deep levels of cooperation and trust between multiple parties to solve.  Examples 
of multilateral issues requiring trust and cooperation abound and include such issues as 
global warming, climate change, and environmental protection; public resource 
management of fisheries, forests, and grazing land; collective action including support of 
charities, product boycotts, and labor relations including strikes; functional governance 
including tax compliance, voting, and neighborhood/park safety and cleanliness; 
teamwork in instances like collective hunting, warfare, and sports; and so on.  Each of 
these instances requires cooperation for progress. 
As demonstrated by the recent strikes in Greece over the newly adopted austerity 
measures, cooperation and trust in our governments is quite important and a lack of it can 
paralyze a country leading to unfortunate results.  Throughout Izmir there are several 
reminders of the importance of cooperation and trust.  Signaling the importance of cooperation on the city level, the Izmir Büyükşehir Belediyesi (the greater Izmir 
Municipality) put up billboards this spring with the words, “Birlikte Güçlüyüz,” which 
mean “Together We are Strong” and encourage residents of Izmir to cooperate for the 
good of the community.  Likewise, the Izmir building of the Central Bank of Turkey 
building has the words, “Vergi Kalkinmanın Temeldir,” which mean, “Taxes are the 
Foundation of Development,” and is intended to encourage people to support the 
development of Turkey by paying their taxes.  All these examples show that cooperation 
or lack thereof has significant impact on society for good or for bad.   
Having established that cooperation is important on both a micro and a macro 
level in society in general and in the economy in particular, it is important to study 
cooperation and trust.  What factors facilitate it?  What hinders it?  What are the economic 
benefits of cooperation or costs of a lack thereof?  Does cooperation look the same 
everywhere or are there cultural variations to it?  How can policy makers encourage 
cooperation and how can individuals seek it out in their relationships?  While it may be 
easy to solicit opinions about these questions, it’s much more difficult to study these 
questions in an empirical way.  Fortunately, for researchers an economic tool exists to 
study just these issues:  the public goods game. 
Simply, a public goods game involves a group of people each with his or her own 
endowment who decide simultaneously to contribute it, or a portion of it, into a group 
project.  Whatever is invested in the group project is multiplied by a fixed growth factor 
and then returned in equal proportions to all the group members regardless of their initial 
contribution to the project and added to whatever remains of each member’s original 
endowment.  The growth factor is set such that the return from each unit invested in the 
group project to the individual is less than one, but the returns to the individual when all 
group members have invested together into the group project are greater than one.  In this 
way, it is always in one’s interest to not contribute to the group project.  However, the 
growth unit is set such that if everyone were to invest into the group project then everyone 
would receive more than they had put in.   
Consider for example the situation when there are four members in a group each 
of whom receives an endowment of 20 units and the growth factor is set at 0.4.  Ayşe could 
choose to contribute no units to the group project.  If her other three group members 
choose likewise not to contribute to the group project, then Ayşe would receive nothing 
from the group project and would end the period with the original 20 units left in her 
endowment (as would the other members of her group).  If instead her other three group 
members were to contribute their entire endowments (a group total of 60 units) to the 
group project, then Ayşe would receive 24 units from the group project (the group total of 
60 units multiplied by the growth factor of 0.4) in addition to the 20 units left in her 
endowment for a total of 44 units.  Her other three group mates having contributed their 
entire endowments to the group project would receive a total of 24 units each all from the 
group project.   
Now consider the opposite situation where Ayşe contributes all her 20 units into 
the group project.  If no other group members contributes to the group project, then Ayşe 
would end the period with a total of 8 units all of which she would receive from the group 
project (the group total of 20 units multiplied by the growth factor of 0.4) having 
contributed her entire endowment in the group project.  In contrast her group members 
would each add 8 units they received from the group project to the 20 units left in their 
endowments for a total of 28 units each.  Finally, if Ayşe as well as her three other group 
members each contributed their entire endowments of 20 units to the group project then 
they would each receive 32 units from the project (the group total of 80 units multiplied by 
the growth factor of 0.4). As can be seen in this example, Ayşe is always better not contributing anything to 
the group project.  If no one else contributes, the 20 units Ayşe chooses not to contribute to 
the group project would be greater than the 8 units she would receive had she fully 
contributed her entire endowment to the group project.  Likewise, if everyone else 
contributes the maximum amount in the project, the 44 units Ayşe receives by not 
contributing anything to the project would be greater than the 32 units she would have 
received had she fully contributed her endowment to the group project.  One point to be 
aware of:  while Ayşe’s individual total is maximized when everyone else, but her fully 
contributes to the group project; the groups total is maximized when everyone fully 
contributes to the group project (116 units vs. 132 units).  In this instance of complete 
group cooperation the maximum wealth is created.  Even though the group as a whole 
does best when everyone invests the maximum amount in the project, Ayşe’s dominant 
strategy, in the language of game theory, is to never contribute in the group project and 
the Nash equilibrium of a public goods game is for there to be no contributions by any 
group member to the group project. 
The public goods game is able to model multilateral cooperation problems as 
individuals simultaneously and independently make contribution choices.  The public 
goods game forces participants to act in an entirely self-interest way by keeping one’s 
endowment and not contributing anything to the group project or in a cooperative, group-
interested way  by contributing from one’s endowment to the group project.  Through the 
decisions made in public goods games by participants, experimental economists are able to 
further study more fully the ephemeral characteristics of trust and cooperation.  
Researchers are able to explore these characteristics through various modifications to the 
treatments of these games and through analysis of individual performance together with 
survey/questionnaire responses.  Public goods games are a tool that enables economists to 
study trust and cooperation not in vitro as is done in theoretical work, but rather in vivo in 
real world performance of participants. 
The in vivo real world performance of participants has overall proven to be 
different, at least in initial periods of play, than what the Nash equilibrium for a public 
goods game implies.  General observations are that most people contrary to the dominant 
strategy choose to contribute a fairly significant portion of their endowment to the group 
project.  While initial contributions to the group project start higher than expected, over 
time the level of contributions decrease.  This decrease in contribution over time has been 
explained as the response of conditional cooperators to the behavior free riders.  Free 
riders are those participants who do not contribute to the group project, but share in its 
benefits.  In addition to these general observations, a variety of additional studies have 
identified factors that enhance, discourage, or have no effect on contribution. 
Gachter and Herrmann (2008) conducted an extensive review of the literature and 
identified the factors that most significantly effect contribution levels.  Factors that increase 
contributions to the public goods games are reputation effects, repeated encounters, 
multiple periods of play with the same group members, communication, and a higher 
group project growth multiplier (although this change in multiplier does not alter the 
dominant strategy of non-contribution).  Anonymity, one-shot play, perpetually changing 
group membership, and a lack of communication all tend to discourage contribution.  It 
does not appear that group size has a significant impact on contribution behavior.  These 
findings will be further examined below. 
Reputation effects occur when behavior is directly associated with the one who 
exhibits it.  When play is anonymous and group members don’t know with whom they are 
playing, contributions are lower.  In contrast, when group member identities are common 
knowledge, contributions increase (Gachter and Fehr 1999).  These reputation effects play 
out most when there is some degree of group identity which acts ”like a ’lubricant’ that makes social exchange effective.”  Reputation effects have also been seen in other research 
regarding cooperative behavior (even when reputation effect is implied) (Andreoni and 
Petrie 2004; Haley and Fessler 2005; Semmann et al. 2005; and Milinski et al. 2002). 
The frequency of game play – whether the game is a one-shot encounter or a 
repeated series of encounters – also significantly effects the contribution levels of the 
participants.  The benefits of repeated play are further enhanced when group members 
remain the same in consecutive rounds of play (Fehr and Gachter 2000; Sonnemens et al. 
1999).  However, even group composition randomization throughout the successive 
rounds of play did not entirely negate the positive effects gained by repeated interactions.  
A somewhat unexpected observation is that contributions are still present beyond a 
superficial level even in one-shot, non-repeated encounters where there is seemingly no 
reason for one to cooperate (Gachter and Herrman 2010).  In spite of the anonymity of 
these interactions, reputation effects – even though reputation is only known to one’s own 
self – are nonetheless strong enough to lead to increased contribution levels. 
Finally, one of the factors that most significantly increases the level of contribution 
in public goods games is the ability for group members to communicate with one another 
during play (Ostrom et al. 1992; Brosig et al. 2003; and Charness and Dufwenberg 2006).  
As participants communicate with one another, they are able to coordinate their actions 
before the game begins and express appreciation (or disappointment) after the game 
concludes.  The research implies that individuals in these games tend to prefer the 
avoidance of guilt to the receipt of praise. 
Regardless of the factors that significantly impact contribution levels, research has 
shown that over additional rounds of anonymous play contributions to the group project 
often decrease sometimes entirely.  This phenomenon has been explained by the theory 
that most people are conditional cooperators (Kelley and Stahelski 1970; Dufwenberg et al. 
2006; and Gachter and Herrmann 2010).  A conditional cooperator is a person who is 
willing to cooperate – in this case by contributing to a group project – so long as the other 
participants in the group are also cooperating.  When everyone cooperates there is a 
positive feedback loop which can maintain high levels of contributions.  However, when 
conditional cooperators are in the same group as free loaders, the free loaders lack of 
contribution (and equal share of the group project benefits) decreases the willingness of 
conditional cooperators to contribute to the group project.   
Fischbacher et al. undertook a study in 2001 to determine what proportion of the 
population are conditional cooperators versus free riders.  According to their study of 44 
Swiss university students, the population was made up of roughly half conditional 
cooperators, a third free riders, and with the remaining classified as nontraditional 
participants.  Whether these proportions are unique to Swiss students or are similar 
elsewhere is an interesting question for future research.  Öneş and Putterman conducted a 
similar study in 2005 grouping participants by type – top cooperators in one group, free 
loaders in another, etc – and discovered that indeed group outcomes are predicated on 
group type and that when grouped together top cooperators achieve near ideal results. 
In light of the prevalence of free riders is there then no hope for increasing (or 
even sustaining) levels of cooperation in public goods games?  Research has shown us a 
potential solution:  introducing a punishment treatment.  Such a treatment enables group 
members to punish one another.  In a typical punishment treatment, punishment is costly 
to both the punisher and the punished.  The punisher pays a fee for each punishment unit, 
that is for every punishment unit a punisher gives the total number of his or her own units 
decrease by one unit.  Meanwhile, for each punishment unit the punished person receives, 
his or her total units are reduced (often by a multiple of the punishment units received).  
When researchers introduce a punishment treatment to public goods games, they find that 
cooperation is prevented from deteriorating.  Not only is the punishment treatment a stopgap which prevents the deterioration of contribution levels, in certain circumstances 
over time the punishment treatment even leads to increased levels of contribution 
(Yamagishi 1986; Ostrom et al. 1992; and Fehr and Gachter 2000). 
As is expected, punishment is used across the board to punish free riders.  When 
the punishment treatment is introduced in a common goods game conditional cooperators 
have an alternative response to free riders (Herrmann et al. 2008).  Whereas previously, 
conditional cooperators could either endure unmerited rewarding of free riders by 
choosing to continue to contribute to the group project or alternatively they could choose 
retain more of their endowment by reducing their own contributions to the group project.  
As was explained above, conditional cooperators in groups containing free riders 
eventually reduce their contributions to zero.  With the introduction of the punishment 
treatment, conditional cooperators have a new option of continuing to cooperate while at 
the same time being able to express their dissatisfaction with free riders through costly 
punishment, which negatively impacts the unmerited returns of free riders. 
The punishment treatment increases and/or stabilizes cooperation at higher levels 
than would be expected in a treatment without punishment (Boyd et al. 2003).  This is an 
especially interesting finding, because evolutionary theorists had previously theorized that 
such “altruistic punishment” would not be present in large groups of nonrelatives.  
Whereas one might incur a personal cost for the benefit of a group of one’s kin, previous 
theories concluded that individuals would not choose to engage in similar costly activity 
when the primary beneficiaries were a large group of nonrelated people.  That altruistic 
punishment exists even in large groups of nonrelatives indicates that something beyond 
evolutionary self-preservation is at play. 
Altruistic punishment is able to create a positive feedback loop whereby 
punishment of free riders leads to increased contributions over repeated interactions (Fehr 
and Gachter 2000; Masclet et al. 2003).  Wondering whether it was just the adverse 
monetary consequences of punishment that led to increased contributions, Masclet et al. 
offered participants in another treatment the opportunity to assign a “non-monetary” 
punishment unit at no personal cost.  They discovered that even a “non-monetary” 
punishment unit led to an increase in overall group contributions, although, not as 
significant or lasting an increase as monetary punishment did. 
While altruistic punishment looks to be an ideal solution to the free rider problem 
in public goods games, the reality is more complicated.  It is true that punishment 
treatments lead to stabilized and sometimes increased contributions.  However, it is 
important to remember that punishment is costly, that is punishment comes at a price.  
Usually public goods games last for no more than ten periods and in that duration the 
monetary costs of punishments, both the costs incurred by assigning punishment and the 
punishment costs themselves to received by the punished, are greater than the increased 
contributions that punishment encourages (Fehr and Gachter 2000).  Overall, punishment 
results in net losses, at least in games with limited numbers of periods, and therefore is not 
a very efficient way of increasing contributions.  Herrmann et al. conducted public goods 
games in sixteen different countries in a study in 2008 and in thirteen of the sixteen 
countries participants accumulated less points in the punishment treatment than in the 
non-punishment treatment.  In order for punishment to be an efficient means of increasing 
group wealth, an important equilibrium needs to be realized between punishment’s 
cooperation enhancing effects and wealth destroying costs. 
Over a long enough time frame punishment does become an effective.  While 
punishment is not effective at enhancing cooperation in most public goods games which 
last for no more than ten periods, as the number of periods of play increase so does the 
effectiveness of punishment.  When the number of periods was expanded to fifty, 
punishment was found to be an efficient way to enhance participant contributions and overall cooperation increased compared to a non-punishment treatment (Gachter et al 
2008).  Beyond laboratory experiments, there is no reason to think that in real life situations 
altruistic punishment, while certainly costly especially at first, wouldn’t reap dividends 
over the long term as well. 
A natural question to ask is what exactly is it that punishment is doing.  How does 
altruistic punishment lead to increased contribution and cooperation?  Masclet et al. (2003) 
propose that punishment is effective for two reasons:  (1) participants realize that 
punishment can make free-riding unprofitable and therefore, seeking to maximize their 
individual payoffs, former free riders increase their contributions in an act of self-interest 
and/or (2) punishment is a way of communicating in an environment where otherwise 
communication is not allowed and this communication leads to increased contributions.  
Participants are able to express through their assignment of punishment points (or lack 
thereof) their feelings about other group members’ levels of participation.  This expression 
of feelings through the assignment of punishment points can in turn cause the recipient to 
feel of shame for being labeled as a free rider.  Those who were shamed through the 
receipt of punishment points might then be motivated to make larger contributions in the 
following rounds in an effort to reduce one’s shame and increase one’s reputation.  In a 
sense, peer pressure is activated through the punishment treatment and this motivates 
participants to behave more cooperatively (Kandel and Lazear 1992). 
While punishment is primarily used altruistically as a tool to punish those who 
contribute less than average to the group project, group members are not restricted to 
using punishment in this way.  It turns out that punishment is a double-edged sword.  
Sometimes punishment is used for reasons other than punishing free rider.  Consider for 
example the situation where one resident of an apartment complex goes above and beyond 
the call of duty to clean the stairwell.  Normally such an individual would be appreciated 
or even rewarded for her efforts.  However, it is conceivable that such an individual would 
instead be punished.  It’s not difficult to imagine an especially persnickety resident who in 
lieu of gratitude creates a mess in front of our good Samaritan’s door.  Whether out of 
shame or aggressiveness or something else, this persnickety resident has anti-socially 
punished the good Samaritan resident. 
We see this same phenomenon in public goods games when those who contribute 
less than average to the group project punish those who contribute more than average.  
While such behavior might be some sort of non-rational idiosyncrasy, another explanation 
might be that perhaps the punisher is using punishment as a means to retaliate against 
previously received punishments (Nikiforakis 2007).  While post hoc theories about the 
motivation of anti-social punishment certainly do exist, an interesting research topic 
would be to investigate punishment motivations in real time.  Whereas the punishment of 
free riding generally increases cooperation, this anti-social punishment of high 
contributors generally has the opposite effect and reduces cooperation.  Furthermore, 
when extensive opportunities exist to avenge received sanctions over several rounds of 
punishment, contributions decrease and there are net losses (Denant-Boemont et al. 2007). 
Anti-social punishment was observed prevalently in a cross-cultural study 
conducted by Herrmann et al. in 16 different participant pools in 2008.  Similar levels of 
altruistic punishment of free riders was observed throughout all the various participant 
pools.  However great diversity existed in the extent to which the various participant pools 
engaged in anti-social punishment.  As was written earlier, punishment didn’t always 
enhance outcomes (in thirteen of the countries in the Herrmann study, participants 
accumulated less points in the punishment treatment than in the non-punishment 
treatment).  Figure 1 below geographically illustrates the participant pools where anti-
social punishment was most prevalent.   Figure 2:  Prevalence of Anti-Social Punishment (Herrmann et al. 2008) 
 
This map was created using Google Maps and ZeeMaps. 
The blue pins indicate participant pools where punishment was predominantly 
altruistic with limited amounts of anti-social punishment.  The red pins indicate pools 
where in addition to altruistic punishment, anti-social punishment was observed with 
significant frequency.  It should be noted that the blue pins are located primarily in 
developed, western countries home to the majority of public goods games research.  Anti-
social punishment was much more prevalent in non-Western, developing countries 
(countries in which previous public goods game research had not been conducted).  
Potentially, the countries where the majority of public goods game research has been 
conducted might be the exception and not the norm of typical punishment behavior. 
Herrmann et al. went on to econometrically analyze the punishment behavior 
(both altruistic and anti-social) on a societal level with criteria commonly used by social 
scientists in the classification of countries.  They found that strong norms of civic 
cooperation in a country are associated with more stringent punishment of free riders and 
that anti-social punishment was significantly correlated with weak norms of civic 
cooperation and weakness of the rule of law.  Norms of civic cooperation and weakness of 
the rule of law explain the variations on a cross-cultural level, but variations of 
punishment behavior on an individual level are left unexplained.   
A study conducted in 2004 by Gachter et al. in rural and urban Russia – one of the 
countries identified in the Herrmann et al. study which had a significant level of anti-social 
punishment – compared individual participants’ socio-economic background as well as 
certain measurements of trust with their performance in a public goods game.  On an 
individual level, Gachter et al. attempted to see whether these criteria explained 
contribution behavior in two one-shot public goods games (one with and one without a 
punishment treatment).  They found that contribution behavior was not directly impacted 
by socio-economic background, but instead was significantly impacted by trust attitudes 
which were in turn influenced by socio-economic background.  Furthermore, three trust 
attitude variables (GSS Fair, GSS Trust, and Trust Strangers, to be explained in more detail 
later) were shown to significantly impact contribution behavior. 
 
4.  Analysis and Results This results and analysis section will look at three specific behaviors:  contribution 
behavior, response to punishment behavior, and punishment behavior.  The contribution 
behavior will examine first period contributions, overall contributions in the N-
experiment, the period effect in the N-experiment, the changes in contribution between N- 
and P-experiments, the period effect in the P-experiment, and average earnings in the N- 
and P-experiments.   
The response to punishment behavior will examine the mean contributions per 
subject pool to the N- and P-experiments, the relative earnings in the P- and N-
experiments over time, punishment’s effect on next round contribution if the person who 
received the punishment’s contribution was below group average, and likewise if the 
punished person’s contribution was above group average.  Finally, punishment behavior 
itself will be analyzed including the mean punishment expenditures, the punishment 
frequencies, the effects of game play on the punishment of free riding and on anti-social 
punishment, and the effects of trust measures, nationalism, and self-described religiosity 
on free riding punishment and on anti-social punishment. 
   4.1 Contribution Behavior 
 
Participants had the option of contributing between 0 and 20 points to the group 
project.  The cumulative distribution of actual contributions in period N1 are shown in 
Graph 1.  The N1 period is the first period of play and so it serves as a base level of 
contribution.  We observe very few people choosing the dominant strategy of no 
contributions (less than 10% overall).  Contributions break along the expected boundaries 
of 0, 5, 10, 15, and 20.  It’s interesting to note that contributions in Izmir were significantly 
higher than contributions in Adiyaman.  The participants in Adiyaman more fully were 
playing the dominant strategy.  In contrast, the participants in Izmir exhibited more 
conditional cooperative behavior (that is, they were more trusting). 
Graph 1:  Cumulative Distribution of the Contributions in N1 
 
  But to more fully understand the contribution behavior it would be helpful to 
compare N1 contribution to the trust attitudes discussed earlier.  The results of this 
analysis are shown in Table 5 on the following page.

















Table 5:  The effects of trust attitudes, nationalism, and self described religiosity as well as socio-economic characteristics on N1 contribution  
Notes:  All trust variables are normalized and resigned such that higher coefficients indicate more trust.  The estimations were conducted using censored Tobit estimation.  Robust standard errors are given in 
parenthesis.  Female, Ethnicity, Only Child, and Eldest Child are dummies.  Urban Background, Middle Class, Religious Practice, and Membership Index are integer values.  Adiyaman is a dummy for the 
corresponding city.  Number known refers to the number of other participants in the session. 
* Denotes significance at 10 percent.   
** Denotes significance at 5 percent.   
***Denotes significance at 1 percent.   
 
Dependent Variable N1 Contribution
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 8 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14
GSS Trust (Insignificant) 0.42 (0.825)
GSS Fair (Insignificant) 1.072 (0.824)
GSS Help (Insignificant) 0.436 (0.800)
GSS Index (Insignificant) 0.792 (0.822)
Trust Strangers (Insignificant) -0.969 (0.804)
Door unlocked (Insignificant)
Lend Money -1.308 (0.779)*
Lend Possessions (Insignificant)
Trust Index (Insignificant)
Trustworthiness (Insignificant) -0.058 (0.806)
Nationalism (Insignificant) -0.13 (1.022)
Against Turban (Insignificant) 0.231 (1.825)
Self Described Religiousity (Insignificant) -1.088 (0.998)
Female 2.869 (1.568)* 2.645 (1.618)* 2.944 (1.654)* 2.675 (1.630)* 2.301 (1.709) 2.579 (1.569)* 2.423 (1.57) 2.878 (1.573)* 3.676 (1.783)** 2.859 (1.57)* 2.284 (1.266)*
Age 0.816 (0.564) 0.887 (0.578) 0.958 (0.62) 0.958 (0.572)* 1.051 (0.63)* 0.781 (0.559) 0.795 (0.557) 0.809 (0.572) 0.965 (0.627) 0.803 (0.573) 0.655 (0.459)
Ethnicity -4.128 (1.796)** -4.124 (1.86)** -4.414 (1.928)** -4.347 (1.846)** -4.3 (1.955)** -4.12 (1.778)** -3.601 (1.801)** -4.16 (1.849)** -4.086 (2.113)** -4.151 (1.805)* -3.135 (1.438)**
Only Child -4.705 (2.889)* -4.368 (3.138) -6.367 (3.254)** -5.519 (3.000)* -6.767 (3.416)** -5.093 (2.879)* -5.326 (2.88)* -4.726 (2.904)* -5.49 (3.134)* -4.745 (2.905)* -3.649 (2.373)
Eldest Child -0.791 (1.94) -0.613 (1.984) -0.606 (2.055) -0.890 (2.002) -0.393 (2.079) -0.955 (1.926) -0.917 (1.918) -0.805 (1.95) 1.031 (2.257) -0.788 (1.939) -0.25 (1.57)
Urban Background -0.22 (0.569) -0.242 (0.602) -0.277 (0.63) -0.063 (0.582) -0.139 (0.645) -0.285 (0.566) -0.215 (0.563) -0.226 (0.576) 0.058 (0.705) -0.227 (0.572) -0.139 (0.463)
Middle Class -0.358 (0.819) -0.26 (0.858) -0.146 (0.86) -0.337 (0.828) -0.088 (0.884) -0.35 (0.811) -0.502 (0.814) -0.361 (0.82) -0.164 (1.093) -0.372 (0.826) -0.222 (0.671)
Religious Practice 0.17 (0.297) 0.237 (0.31) 0.278 (0.318) 0.046 (0.305) 0.236 (0.328) 0.229 (0.298) 0.173 (0.294) 0.172 (0.298) 0.454 (0.355) 0.184 (0.316) 0.256 (0.302)
Memberhip Index -0.021 (0.223) -0.011 (0.228) -0.114 (0.242) -0.065 (0.236) -0.106 (0.244) -0.068 (0.224) -0.01 (0.221) -0.023 (0.225) -0.244 (0.308) -0.02 (0.223) -0.055 (0.186)
Adiyaman -7.552 (2.472)*** -7.651 (2.561)*** -7.593 (2.654)*** -7.741 (2.516)*** -7.82 (2.614)*** -7.443 (2.447)*** -7.092 (2.457)*** -7.612 (2.61)*** -7.497 (3.312)** -7.503 (2.501)*** -5.459 (1.984)***
Number Known 0.08 (0.078) 0.09 (0.08) 0.1 (0.084) 0.092 (0.079) 0.118 (0.083) 0.095 (0.078) 0.07 (0.077) 0.081 (0.08) 0.11 (0.107) 0.081 (0.078) 0.048 (0.064)
C 13.866 (4.865)*** 12.984 (5.095)*** 12.77 (5.159)*** 13.669 (4.959)*** 11.907 (5.341)** 13.974 (4.816)*** 14.042 (4.812)*** 13.956 (5.024)*** 9.96 (6.404) 13.768 (4.925)*** 13.89 (4.222)***
Observations 116 113 108 111 103 116 116 116 96 116 116
R
2 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.16 
As shown in Table 5, there are several socio-economic characteristics that effected 
N1 contribution, but only one trust attitude (all the trust attitudes previously discussed 
were tested but only selected ones were listed).  The only socio-economic factor that 
increased one’s N1 contribution was gender.  Females made higher N1 contributions than 
males.  They exhibited greater trust being more willing to take a risk than men were.  Two 
socio-economic factors led to decreased N1 contributions.  These were ethnicity and 
whether or not one was an only child.  According to our results, Turks and only children 
made smaller N1 contributions than non-Turks and participants with siblings.  
Furthermore, there were significant differences in the N1 contribution levels between 
Adiyaman and Izmir.  Participants in Adiyaman contributed some 7.5 less points in the N1 
round to the public project than did their Izmir counterparts. 
The one trust attitude which was significant was Lend Money.  Participants who 
more frequently gave monetary loans to their friends contributed 1.3 points less that others 
in the N1 round.  This finding had a significance level of 10%.  This result seems a bit 
counter-intuitive, but the trust attitude question asked loaning money to friends and not 
about contributing anonymously to a group project with strangers.  Obviously these 
participants viewed the group project differently than they viewed loaning friends money. 
Graph 2 shows the contributions to the N-experiment over time.  From this graph 
one can easily see that contributions decreased across the board over time.  The effect is 
especially pronounced in the Izmir group.  The Izmir group began contributing an average 
of 11 points in the N1 period and finished the N10 period contributing about 6 points.  The 
Adiyaman group began contributing less, around 8 points in the N1 period, and 
experienced a less steep decline in contributions ending up contributing around 6.5 points 
in the N10 period.  The Adiyaman participants seem to be playing the game in a rather 
tempered way. 
 
Graph 2:  Contributions to the N-Experiment 
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The performance of the Adiyaman group is unexpected.  The participants in 
Adiyaman were not as significantly discouraged by the free rider effects as participants in 
Izmir or in other populations have been.  This unique finding indicates that perhaps the 
conditional cooperators of Adiyaman have a higher tolerance for the inequity of free riding 
than participants elsewhere. 
It is possible to see the average period effects in the N-experiment by performing a 
Tobit estimation.  Using this test, the effects of each successive period on contribution 
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Table 6:  Period effects on contribution in the N-Experiment 
   Dependent Variable Contribution    
   Overall  Adiyaman  Izmir 
       
Period  -0.551 (0.119)***  -0.34 (0.128)***  -0.883 (0.237)*** 
Final Period  1.292 (1.148)  1.608 (1.233)  0.682 (2.3) 
C  10 (0.667)***  8.55 (0.72)***  12.144 (1.324)*** 
       
Observations  1160  640  520 
R2  0.02  0.01  0.03 
Notes:  The estimations were conducted using censored Tobit estimation.  Robust standard errors are given in parenthesis.  
Final Period is a dummy value.   
* Denotes significance at 10 percent.   
** Denotes significance at 5 percent.   
***Denotes significance at 1 percent.   
The period effect is obviously very significant (at a level of 1 %) in our data for 
both Adiyaman and Izmir.  For every passing period, contributions decreased by 0.34 
points in the Adiyaman group.  An even more pronounced effect is seen in the Izmir 
group.  For each passing period contributions decrease by 0.88 points (nearly a point a 
period) in the Izmir group.  From this analysis the substantial deterioration of contribution 
levels over time in this the non-punishment treatment is seen.  
What is the effect on contribution levels when punishment is introduced?  As has 
been demonstrated elsewhere, punishment stabilizes the contribution levels in both 
Adiyaman and Izmir.  In Adiyaman contribution levels in period P1 were just about 6 
points.  By period P10, contribution levels had increased to nearly 7 points.  In Izmir we 
saw an even more pronounced effect.  Contribution levels began around 7.5 points in 
period P1 for the Izmir group and finished period P10 at approximately 9 points. 
Graph 3, below, illustrates the changes in contribution between the N- and the P-
experiments overall and for both Adiyaman and Izmir individually. 




Punishment appears to stabilize contribution levels and even slightly increase 
these levels in the Izmir population.  However, significant increases in contribution levels 
are not seen.  An area of interest for future study would be the longer-term effect of 
punishment. Perhaps over a long enough time frame punishment might induce increased 
overall contribution levels. 
In a way similar to Table 6, what the period effects on contribution were in the P-
experiment can be investigated.  Remember that in each successive period in the N-
experiment treatment the level of contributions significantly decline by 0.55 point on 
average. What effect doest the introduction of punishment have on this deteriorating 
period effect in the P-experiment?  The analysis is shown in Table 7. 
Table 7:  Period effects on contribution in the P-Experiment 
   Dependent Variable Contribution    
   Overall  Adiyaman  Izmir 
       
Period  0.058 (0.109)  0.05 (0.119)  0.059 (0.213) 
Final Period  0.519 (1.049)  0.146 (1.138)  1.131 (2.046) 
C  6.29 (0.615)***  5.979 (0.668)***  6.69 (1.197)*** 
       
Observations  1160  640  520 
R2  0.00  0.00  0.00 
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Notes:  The estimations were conducted using censored Tobit estimation.  Robust standard errors are given in parenthesis.  
Final Period is a dummy value.   
* Denotes significance at 10 percent.   
** Denotes significance at 5 percent.   
***Denotes significance at 1 percent. 
 
As can be seen in Table 7, the period effect has disappeared.  Where as the overall 
loss of 0.55 points per period was significant at 10 percent, there is no significant period 
effect in the P-experiment.  Introduction of punishment has completely eliminated the 
deteriorating period effect and solved, to some extent, the free rider problem.  As noted 
above though, it does not appear that punishment significantly increases contribution 
level.  Rather, punishment is more a stabilizer of contributions and means of preventing 
further contribution deterioration. 
So if contribution level has been effectively stabilized, does that mean that the 
average earnings in the P-experiment increased?  Average earnings are total points 
received at the end of each period, i.e. the sum of the points distributed from the group 
project and points retained from the initial endowment. Table 8 shows the answer to that 
question by comparing the average earnings in the N-experiment and the P-experiment.  
Table 8:  Average Earnings in the N- and P-Experiments 
   Average earnings in  Percentage change 
relative to N-experiment     N-experiment  P-experiment 
Overall  24.54  10.58  -56.88% 
Adiyaman  24.30  12.45  -48.75% 
Izmir  24.85  8.28  -66.66% 
 
Average earnings in the P-experiment were much lower than average earnings in 
the N-experiment.  Overall there was a 57% decrease in earnings in the P-experiment.  The 
Izmir group experienced the largest percent decline seeing a 67% reduction in average 
earnings from nearly 25 points to nearly 8 points.  As to why earnings were so much lower 
in the P-experiment than in the N-experiment, it is important to remember that 
punishment is costly.  It consumes resources to punish someone while punishment itself is 
a destruction of resources.  Although contribution levels have stabilized in the P-
experiment, the costs of that stabilization through punishment are greater than the costs of 
the free-riding problem at least in the short term of this 10 period experiment. 
Furthermore, at this point it is well worth remembering the dominant strategy in a 
public goods game.  As elaborated above, the dominant strategy in a public good game is 
for each individual to not contribute any points from his or her endowment into the group 
project.  When punishment is introduced, the dominant punishment strategy is never to 
exercise any punishment.  Had the participants in the P-experiment strictly followed the 
dominant strategy, they would have earned nearly twice as many points as they actually 
did.  
  
4.2 Response to Punishment 
 
We’ve seen so far that punishment, at significant costs, prevents the deteriorating 
period effect and stabilizes contributions in this experiment.  Let’s look more deeply as to 
what it is that punishment is doing.  Table 9 summarizes the mean contributions in the N- 
and the P-experiments both in period 1 and over all the periods. 
Table 9:  Mean contributions per subject pool in the N- and P-Experiments 
  Contribution in period 1 
  N-Exp  P-Exp  Percentage Change  p-value 
Overall  9.5  6.7  -29.55%  0.000 
AU  8.2  6.0  -27.70%  0.009 
IEU  11.0  7.6  -31.24%  0.000 
         
  Contribution over all periods 
  N-Exp  P-Exp  Percentage change  p-value 
Overall  7.6  7.2  -4.73%  0.002 
AU  7.2  6.7  -6.74%  0.319 
IEU  8.1  7.9  -2.52%  0.073 
Notes:  The p-values were determined by a Wilcoxon signed-rank test.   
 
As can be see above, punishment leads to significant differences in contribution 
levels.  The differences in period one contributions between the N- and the P-experiments 
are stark.  There was a 30% decline in contributions from the N- to the P-experiment in 
period one.  When this is compared with the mean contributions over all periods, we see 
that the negative percent change has decreased.  The changes in contributions from the N- 
to the P-experiments in Izmir were the most dramatic.  In period one, there was a 31% 
decrease in contributions between the N- and P-experiments; whereas, when all periods 
were considered the mean contribution saw only a 2.5% decrease.  If the experiment would 
have run for a few more periods, it’s quite possible that the percentage changes could have 
become positive indicating increased giving in the P-experiment. 
Graph 4 visually illustrates this idea comparing the relative earnings over time in 
both Adiyaman and Izmir.  When this number is equal to zero then it means that the costs 
of the punishment treatment have been covered by the corresponding gains in efficiency. 
Graph 4:  Relative earnings in the P- and the N-experiment over time  
 
 
While the relative earnings in the P- and the N-experiment do not reach zero in the 
10 periods of this experiment – they reach just under 0.6 – there is a definite positive trend 
that given enough time would likely reach the zero mark and potentially progress to 
positive efficiency. 
So what effect does punishment have on various contributors?  In any punishment 
circumstance the punished person could have contributed in one of two ways.  They could 
have contributed bellow the group average or they could have contributed equal to or 
above the group average.  The effects of punishment on both of these cases will now be 
investigated. 
In the first case, the punished person contributed less than the group average, that 
is the person was a free rider.  We looked to see what the effect of altruistic punishment 
would be on a free riders’ contribution in the next round.  In this analysis a positive change 
in contribution means that the punished person increased their contributions in the next 
round, while a negative change in contribution means that the punished person decreased 
their contribution.  Table 10 summarizes our findings. 
Table 3:  Punishment's effect on next round contribution if present contribution was 
below average 
   Dependent Variable Change in Contribution 
   Overall  Adiyaman  Izmir 
       
Reduction  -0.077 (0.016)***  -0.082 (0.021)***  -0.064 (0.026)*** 
Period  -0.079 (0.096)  -0.151 (0.12)  0.015 (0.158) 
Final Period  0.344 (0.781)  1.735 (0.986)*  -1.442 (1.259) 
C  1.35 (0.538)***  1.433 (0.649)**  1.394 (0.931) 
       
Observations  542  307  235 
R2  0.04  0.06  0.04 
Notes:  The estimations were conducted using censored Tobit estimation.  Robust standard errors are given in parenthesis.  
Final Period is a dummy value.   
* Denotes significance at 10 percent.   
** Denotes significance at 5 percent.   
***Denotes significance at 1 percent. 
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As can be seen in Table 10, altruistic punishment overall increased contributions in 
the next round.  The constant term indicates that those who contributed less than average 
would increase their contributions by 1.35 on average following punishment (with 
significance at 1 percent for the overall group and significance at 5 percent for the 
Adiyaman group).  Interestingly, the greater the amount of altruistic punishment 
(represented as reduction in the table) was, the smaller the increase in contribution.  This 
trend was significant at 1 percent across the board.  It’s as if the punished party while 
recognizing his or her need to increase contributions did not respond particularly well to 
receiving punishment, especially punishment of significant size. 
Table 11 investigates the opposite case where anti-social punishment as opposed 
to altruistic punishment is employed.  The effects are what might be expected.  In general, 
anti-social punishment decreases the future contribution of conditional cooperators.  
Strangely the magnitude of punishment had a highly significant, but unexpected result for 
the overall group and the Izmir group.  For each anti-social punishment point received, 
conditional cooperators from those two locations actually reduced the size of their 
contribution reduction (that is, a conditional cooperator who was punished more severely 
reduced his or her future contribution less than a one who was punished less severely).  
This phenomenon is quite unexpected and may be some form of opposite spite. 
Table 4:  Punishment's effect on next round contribution if present contribution was 
above average 
   Dependent Variable Change in Contribution 
   Overall  Adiyaman  Izmir 
       
Reduction  0.075 (0.021)***  -0.028 (0.038)  0.126 (0.026)*** 
Period  0.099 (0.119)  -0.033 (0.166)  0.253 (0.168) 
Final Period  0.003 (0.988)  -0.137 (1.359)  0.122 (1.411) 
C  -1.767 (0.656)***  -1.866 (0.898)**  -1.925 (0.95)** 
       
Observations  502  269  233 
R2  0.03  0.00  0.11 
Notes:  The estimations were conducted using censored Tobit estimation.  Robust standard errors are given in parenthesis.  
Final Period is a dummy value.   
* Denotes significance at 10 percent.   
** Denotes significance at 5 percent.   
***Denotes significance at 1 percent. 
 
As you can see, punishment – both altruistic and anti-social – has significant 
effects on next round contribution behavior in of this population.  One further area to 
investigate is that of punishment behavior. 
 
    
4.3 Punishment Behavior 
 
The mean punishment expenditures are show in Graph 5.  The left side of this 
graph represents altruistic punishment or the punishment of free riders.  The right side of 
this graph in contrast represents anti-social punishment or the punishment of participants 
who are contributing more than the punishers.  The various colors represent the size of 
deviation between the punisher and the punished party. 
Graph 5:  Mean Punishment Expenditures 
 
Notes:  Participants in the P-experiment had the option of punishing their other group members.  This is a graph of mean 
punishment expenditures for those who exercised that option and it excludes those who chose not to exercise punishment in 
order to emphasize the amount of punishment exercised. 
 
It can be seen here that altruistic punishment was generally more severe than anti-
social punishment.  However, anti-social punishment was very present.  These results are 
very similar to those reached by Herrmann et al. in their experiment in their experiments 
at Boğaziçi University in Istanbul, Turkey (2008).  One observation to note is that in 
Adiyaman there was less of both altruistic punishment and anti-social punishment (just as 
there were less contributions overall). 
If these are the mean punishments when punishment was exercised, then at what 
frequency was punishment exercised?  Graph 6 shows the punishment frequencies.   
 














Deviation from punisher's contrib. 
Graph 6:  Punishment Frequencies 
 
 
Overall altruistic punishment was exercise more often than anti-social 
punishment.  In Izmir, altruistic punishment was exercised approximately 60% of the time.  
In contrast, altruistic punishment was only exercised approximately 45% of the time in 
Adiyaman.  In both Izmir and Adiyaman, anti-social punishment was exercised less 
frequently than altruistic punishment, but it was still significantly present.  Interestingly 
punishment on the extremes of maximum variation was practiced more frequently than in 
cases of less variation.  This would be expected for altruistic punishment, but is somewhat 
surprising for anti-social punishment.
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Deviation from the punisher's contribution 
Table 12:  Free Riding Punishment Explained by Game Play 
 
Notes:  The pooled estimates were conducted using OLS estimation.  The remaining estimations were conducted using censored Tobit estimation.  Robust standard errors are given in parenthesis.  Final Period is a 
dummy value.  Adiyaman is a dummy value for the corresponding city.  
* Denotes significance at 10 percent.   
** Denotes significance at 5 percent.   




Punished Contribution -0.079 (0.03)*** -0.078 (0.03)*** -0.138 (0.032)*** -0.061 (0.03)** -0.195 (0.05)*** 0.022 (0.039)
Punishers' Contribution 0.024 (0.02) 0.025 (0.02) 0.084 (0.022)*** -0.009 (0.022) -0.041 (0.033) 0.021 (0.03)
Other Group Members Contrib. 0.104 (0.022)*** 0.107 (0.022)*** 0.048 (0.024)** 0.09 (0.023)*** 0.132 (0.035)*** 0.029 (0.029)
Received Punishment T-1 0.017 (0.028) -0.131 (0.027)*** 0.038 (0.029) 0.043 (0.044) 0.041 (0.036)
Period 0.245 (0.043)*** 0.257 (0.048)*** -0.101 (0.046)** 0.208 (0.05)*** 0.481 (0.081)*** 0.036 (0.063)
Final Period -0.665 (0.419) -0.681 (0.42) -0.336 (0.445) -0.396 (0.423) -0.472 (0.612) -0.253 (0.575)
Accumulated Earnings -0.029 (0.002)*** -0.029 (0.003)*** -0.032 (0.003)*** -0.049 (0.005)*** -0.024 (0.003)***
Adiyaman -0.015 (0.216) -0.005 (0.217)
C -0.634 (0.347)* 1.061 (0.347)*** 1.236 (0.501)*** 1.568 (0.486)***
Observations 1490 1490 1490 1490 865 625
Log Likelihood -2491.92 -2491.74
R
2 0.05 0.15 0.14 0.18
Overall Pooled 
Table 13:  Anti Social Punishment Explained by Game Play 
 
Notes:  The pooled estimates were conducted using OLS estimation.  The remaining estimations were conducted using censored Tobit estimation.  Robust standard errors are given in parenthesis.  Final Period is a 
dummy value.  Adiyaman is a dummy value for the corresponding city. 
* Denotes significance at 10 percent.   
** Denotes significance at 5 percent.   
***Denotes significance at 1 percent
Dependent Variable Punishment
Overall Adiyaman Izmir
Punished Contribution 0.029 (0.02) 0.036 (0.021)* 0.057 (0.024)** 0.046 (0.022)** 0.036 (0.03) 0.042 (0.032)
Punishers' Contribution -0.042 (0.028) -0.047 (0.028)* -0.052 (0.03)* -0.044 (0.028) 0.01 (0.042) -0.074 (0.039)*
Other Group Members Contrib. 0.048 (0.022)** 0.058 (0.023)*** 0.053 (0.026)** 0.074 (0.024)*** 0.077 (0.034)** 0.073 (0.034)**
Received Punishment T-1 0.064 (0.029)** -0.19 (0.029)*** 0.047 (0.031) 0.048 (0.046) 0.07 (0.042)*
Period 0.239 (0.043)*** 0.294 (0.05)*** -0.081 (0.051) 0.345 (0.055)*** 0.339 (0.08)*** 0.299 (0.077)***
Final Period 0.184 (0.441) 0.049 (0.446) -0.069 (0.488) -0.111 (0.46) -0.43 (0.605) 0.308 (0.681)
Accumulated Earnings -0.034 (0.002)*** -0.037 (0.003)*** -0.037 (0.003)*** -0.03 (0.004)*** -0.042 (0.004)***
Adiyaman -0.689 (0.224)*** -0.667 (0.224)***
C -2.573 (0.376)*** -0.914 (0.353)*** -1.609 (0.455)*** -0.004 (0.547)
Observations 1990 1990 1990 1990 1055 935
Log Likelihood -2712.523 -2710.15
R
2 0.03 0.16 0.10 0.17
Overall Pooled 
Tables 12 and 13 look at punishment in light of game play.  Table 12 shows that 
free riding punishment is consistently and highly significantly related to the contribution 
of the punished participant.  The more the punished participant contributed, the lower the 
free riding punishment they received.  The contributions of the other two group members, 
the period, and the accumulated earnings of the punisher were also significant factors.  
Interestingly, one of the most significant factors across the board was the amount of 
accumulated earnings.  The greater one’s total profit from all the previous rounds, the less 
one was likely to punish free riders.  The wealthy were less likely to engage in the 
refereeing and disciplining of free riders and instead either ignored free riding or relied on 
others to carry out the job of policing the group.  
Table 13 shows that there is less anti-social punishment in Adiyaman than in 
Izmir.  In Izmir, a slightly increased amount of punishment was consistently and 
significantly associated with the punishment received in the previous round.  Punishment 
received in the previous period slightly increased the amount of anti-social punishment 
given for the participants in Izmir indicating that revenge could have been a factor for anti-
social punishment.  Another observation was that greater contributions to the group 
project by punishers led to smaller amounts of anti-social punishment for the Izmir 
participants.  Furthermore, in both Adiyaman and Izmir, greater contributions by the other 
group members’ led to increased anti-social punishment.  Unexpectedly, anti-social 
punishment was only slightly related to the level of contribution to the group project by 
the person receiving the punishment. Also, interesting was the increase of both free riding 
and anti-social punishments in the later periods.  Perhaps the most influential variable 
effecting anti-social punishment behavior was the punishers’ accumulated earnings.  The 
more one accumulated, the less inclined they were to punish anti-socially.  This confirms 
what was observed above in regards to free riding punishment.  It turns out that wealth 
and its preservation, especially over time, trumps other motivating factors. 
Beyond the game play explanations, Tables 14 and 15 explore the effects of socio-
economic characteristics, trust attitudes, nationalism, and self-described religiosity on both 
free riding punishment and anti-social punishment through Tobit estimations.   
According to our analysis certain socio-economic traits influence the punishment 
of free riders.  The following effects were observed at a high level of statistical significance 
(significance at 1 percent).  Older participants assigned free riders fewer punishment 
points, as did only children.  People from larger cities punish free riders less severely, as 
did those who had higher levels of religious practice.  Participants knew more people in 
the experiment assigned fewer punishment points to free riders.  Also, female participants 
and members of civic groups punished free riders with fewer punishment points than did 
male partcipants (at a significance level of 5%). 
Several factors from our trust survey effected the punishment of free riders.  
Participants who scored highly on the GSS Fair, GSS Help, GSS Index, and/or Trust 
Strangers, categories punished free riders less stringently.  In contrast, participants who 
scored high on the GSS Trust and/or Trustworthiness categories assigned free riders more 
punishment points.  All of these relationships are significant at 1 percent.  Participants who 
scored highly on the IAT country test, that is more nationalistic participants, were also 
more likely to assign free riders more punishment points than others (at a level of 10 
percent).  In contrast, participants who supported the law banning headscarves in public 
places were less likely to assign punishment points to free riders (at a level of 10 percent) 
as were participants with a high self-described level of religiosity (at a level of 1 percent). 
Considering the socio-economic make up of anti social punishers, we see that 
female participants and Turks (at a 1 percent level of significance), and voluntary group 
members (at a 5 percent level of significance) all assigned more anti-social punishment  
Table 14:  The effects of trust attitudes, nationalism, and self-described religiosity as well as socio-economic characteristics on free riding punishment 
 
Notes:  All trust variables are normalized and resigned such that higher coefficients indicate more trust.  The estimations were conducted using censored Tobit estimation.  Robust standard errors are given in 
parenthesis.  Female, Ethnicity, Only Child, and Eldest Child are dummies.  Urban Background, Middle Class, Religious Practice, and Membership Index are integer values.  Adiyaman is a dummy for the 
corresponding city.  Number known refers to the number of other participants in the session. 
* Denotes significance at 10 percent.   
** Denotes significance at 5 percent.   
***Denotes significance at 1 percent.
Dependent Variable Free-Riding Punishment
Model 1 Model 1.5 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13
GSS Trust 0.289 (0.119)**
GSS Fair -0.507 (0.119)***
GSS Help -0.39 (0.118)***
GSS Index -0.393 (0.12)***
Trust Strangers -0.25 (0.116)**
Door unlocked (Insignificant) 0.086 (0.121)





Against Turban -0.664 (0.265)***
Self Described Religiosity (Insignificant)
Punished Contribution -0.078 (0.03)*** -0.065 (0.031)** -0.079 (0.031)*** -0.078 (0.03)*** -0.065 (0.031)** -0.077 (0.03)*** -0.079 (0.03)*** -0.08 (0.03)*** -0.086 (0.03)*** -0.094 (0.032)*** -0.08 (0.03)***
Punisher Contribution 0.022 (0.022) 0.021 (0.023) 0.04 (0.023)* 0.028 (0.022) 0.036 (0.024) 0.019 (0.023) 0.021 (0.022) 0.024 (0.023) 0.019 (0.022) 0.041 (0.024)* 0.016 (0.023)
Others Average Contribution 0.072 (0.023)*** 0.08 (0.023)*** 0.079 (0.023)*** 0.074 (0.023)*** 0.081 (0.023)*** 0.072 (0.023)*** 0.07 (0.023)*** 0.071 (0.023)*** 0.064 (0.023)*** 0.089 (0.025)*** 0.071 (0.023)***
Received Punishment T-1 0.041 (0.028) 0.06 (0.029)* 0.051 (0.03)* 0.027 (0.028) 0.045 (0.03) 0.036 (0.028) 0.04 (0.028) 0.042 (0.028) 0.035 (0.028) 0.067 (0.03)** 0.04 (0.028)
Period 0.166 (0.049)*** 0.186 (0.05)*** 0.173 (0.05)*** 0.161 (0.049)*** 0.197 (0.051)*** 0.161 (0.049)*** 0.167 (0.049)*** 0.166 (0.049)*** 0.157 (0.049)*** 0.196 (0.055)*** 0.171 (0.049)***
Final Period -0.309 (0.416) -0.29 (0.418) -0.334 (0.435) -0.484 (0.415) -0.502 (0.44) -0.299 (0.416) -0.299 (0.416) -0.29 (0.416) -0.27 (0.415) -0.178 (0.435) -0.311 (0.415)
Accumulated Earnings -0.028 (0.003)*** -0.028 (0.003)*** -0.028 (0.003)*** -0.025 (0.003)*** -0.027 (0.003)*** -0.027 (0.003)*** -0.028 (0.003)*** -0.028 (0.003)*** -0.027 (0.003)*** -0.028 (0.003)*** -0.028 (0.003)***
Female -0.534 (0.246)** -0.455 (0.233)** -0.569 (0.234)** -0.584 (0.24)** -0.598 (0.241)*** -0.591 (0.245)** -0.515 (0.235)** -0.429 (0.236)* -0.402 (0.236)* -0.555 (0.234)** -0.728 (0.265)*** -0.509 (0.233)**
Age -0.414 (0.093)*** -0.426 (0.087)*** -0.417 (0.088)*** -0.501 (0.091)*** -0.449 (0.085)*** -0.501 (0.091)*** -0.445 (0.088)*** -0.418 (0.087)*** -0.424 (0.087)*** -0.379 (0.087)*** -0.479 (0.088)*** -0.391 (0.088)***
Ethnicity -0.356 (0.277) -0.385 (0.258) -0.683 (0.266)*** -0.472 (0.274)* -0.259 (0.258) -0.623 (0.273)** -0.391 (0.258) -0.396 (0.258) -0.476 (0.266)* -0.173 (0.263) -0.54 (0.286)* -0.268 (0.261)
Only Child -2.979 (0.517)*** -2.299 (0.484)*** -1.146 (0.533)** -1.129 (0.581)** -2.147 (0.48)*** -1.202 (0.577)** -2.326 (0.487)*** -2.297 (0.483)*** -2.243 (0.485)*** -2.021 (0.486)*** -2.618 (0.478)*** -2.132 (0.488)***
Eldest Child -0.08 (0.307) -0.004 (0.285) 0.034 (0.283) -0.106 (0.287) 0.098 (0.284) -0.002 (0.284) -0.054 (0.286) 0.026 (0.287) 0.003 (0.284) -0.007 (0.283) 0.459 (0.313) -0.025 (0.284)
Urban Background -0.42 (0.087)*** -0.303 (0.082)*** -0.202 (0.086)** -0.213 (0.087)** -0.344 (0.082)*** -0.284 (0.089)*** -0.323 (0.083)*** -0.299 (0.082)*** -0.312 (0.082)*** -0.258 (0.083)*** -0.423 (0.098)*** -0.289 (0.082)***
Middle Class 0.095 (0.124) 0.001 (0.116) -0.124 (0.122) -0.09 (0.121) -0.012 (0.113) -0.112 (0.122) 0.02 (0.116) 0.027 (0.122) 0.023 (0.117) -0.022 (0.116) 0.109 (0.144) 0.048 (0.117)
Religious Practice -0.174 (0.047)*** -0.146 (0.044)*** -0.158 (0.046)*** -0.16 (0.045)*** -0.097 (0.045)** -0.143 (0.047)*** -0.138 (0.044)*** -0.142 (0.045)*** -0.146 (0.044)*** -0.162 (0.044)*** -0.176 (0.05)*** -0.186 (0.047)***
Membership Index -0.048 (0.034) -0.065 (0.032)** -0.061 (0.032)* -0.055 (0.034)* -0.049 (0.033) -0.041 (0.033) -0.08 (0.033)** -0.071 (0.033)** -0.064 (0.032)** -0.046 (0.033) -0.031 (0.043) -0.068 (0.032)**
Adiyaman -1.075 (0.376)*** -0.256 (0.356) -0.451 (0.356) -0.522 (0.359) -0.308 (0.355) -0.353 (0.355) -0.176 (0.358) -0.22 (0.359) -0.353 (0.362) 0.013 (0.361) 0.038 (0.471) -0.376 (0.359)
Number Known -0.031 (0.012)*** -0.028 (0.011)*** -0.029 (0.011)*** -0.027 (0.012)** -0.029 (0.011)*** -0.032 (0.012)*** -0.025 (0.011)** -0.03 (0.012)*** -0.027 (0.011)** -0.037 (0.012)*** -0.023 (0.015) -0.028 (0.011)**
C 5.117 (0.787)*** 5.214 (0.799)*** 5.433 (0.82)*** 5.495 (0.816)*** 4.891 (0.789)*** 5.55 (0.823)*** 5.255 (0.8)*** 5.116 (0.809)*** 5.235 (0.799)*** 4.925 (0.799)*** 4.473 (0.962)*** 5.547 (0.809)***
Observations 1490 1490 1424 1398 1420 1304 1490 1490 1490 1490 1198 1490
R
2 0.06 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.18 
Table 15:  The effects of trust attitudes, nationalism, and self-described religiosity as well as socio-economic characteristics on anti-social punishment 
 
Notes:  All trust variables are normalized and resigned such that higher coefficients indicate more trust.  The estimations were conducted using censored Tobit estimation.  Robust standard errors are given in 
parenthesis.  Female, Ethnicity, Only Child, and Eldest Child are dummies.  Urban Background, Middle Class, Religious Practice, and Membership Index are integer values.  Adiyaman is a dummy for the 
corresponding city.  Number known refers to the number of other participants in the session. 
* Denotes significance at 10 percent.   
** Denotes significance at 5 percent.   
***Denotes significance at 1 percent.
Dependent Variable Anti-Social Punishment
Model 1 Model 1.5 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13
GSS Trust 0.561 (0.129)***
GSS Fair -0.275 (0.135)**
GSS Help (Insignificant) 0.159 (0.128)
GSS Index (Insignificant) 0.097 (0.131)
Trust Strangers -0.483 (0.132)***
Door unlocked 0.245 (0.122)**





Against Turban 0.475 (0.287)*
Self Described Religiosity (Insignificant)
Punished Contributions 0.036 (0.022)* 0.028 (0.022) 0.03 (0.023) 0.026 (0.022) 0.023 (0.023) 0.037 (0.022)* 0.033 (0.022) 0.03 (0.022) 0.029 (0.022) 0.065 (0.023)*** 0.035 (0.022)*
Punisher Contributions -0.041 (0.028) -0.042 (0.028) -0.054 (0.029)* -0.036 (0.028) -0.056 (0.029)* -0.047 (0.028)* -0.039 (0.028) -0.037 (0.028) -0.037 (0.028) -0.041 (0.029) -0.041 (0.028)
Others Average Contribution 0.04 (0.024)* 0.033 (0.024) 0.038 (0.026) 0.063 (0.025)*** 0.062 (0.026)** 0.042 (0.024)* 0.035 (0.024) 0.034 (0.024) 0.035 (0.024) 0.052 (0.026)** 0.043 (0.024)*
Received Punishment T-1 0.024 (0.03) 0.023 (0.031) 0.015 (0.033) 0.018 (0.03) 0.016 (0.032) 0.025 (0.03) 0.026 (0.03) 0.019 (0.03) 0.021 (0.03) 0.029 (0.031) 0.024 (0.03)
Period 0.308 (0.054)*** 0.31 (0.055)*** 0.308 (0.058)*** 0.292 (0.054)*** 0.305 (0.057)*** 0.306 (0.054)*** 0.315 (0.054)*** 0.317 (0.054)*** 0.314 (0.054)*** 0.287 (0.058)*** 0.308 (0.054)***
Final Period -0.042 (0.448) -0.044 (0.447) -0.072 (0.469) -0.047 (0.443) -0.201 (0.463) -0.019 (0.447) -0.05 (0.447) 0.015 (0.448) -0.056 (0.447) -0.232 (0.468) -0.04 (0.448)
Accumulated Earnings -0.033 (0.003)*** -0.032 (0.003)*** -0.033 (0.003)*** -0.032 (0.003)*** -0.031 (0.003)*** -0.033 (0.003)*** -0.034 (0.003)*** -0.034 (0.003)*** -0.033 (0.003)*** -0.03 (0.003)*** -0.033 (0.003)***
Female 1.101 (0.261)*** 0.903 (0.247)*** 0.781 (0.25)*** 0.797 (0.261)*** 0.763 (0.255)*** 0.614 (0.259)** 0.723 (0.251)*** 0.955 (0.249)*** 0.695 (0.252)*** 0.873 (0.247)*** 0.818 (0.265)*** 0.87 (0.248)***
Age -0.253 (0.094)*** -0.235 (0.087)*** -0.239 (0.087)*** -0.287 (0.098)*** -0.247 (0.085)*** -0.244 (0.094)*** -0.238 (0.087)*** -0.21 (0.087)** -0.246 (0.087)*** -0.183 (0.088)** -0.284 (0.088)*** -0.259 (0.088)***
Ethnicity 1.067 (0.313)*** 1.221 (0.291)*** 1.28 (0.293)*** 1.388 (0.311)*** 1.14 (0.29)*** 1.231 (0.304)*** 1.166 (0.291)*** 1.185 (0.291)*** 1.378 (0.293)*** 1.574 (0.308)*** 0.984 (0.322)*** 1.186 (0.292)***
Only Child -2.872 (0.495)*** -1.136 (0.472)** -0.714 (0.483) -1.753 (0.526)*** -1.353 (0.486)*** -2.17 (0.545)*** -1.546 (0.487)*** -1.149 (0.469)*** -1.379 (0.475)*** -1.073 (0.47)** -1.283 (0.474)*** -1.165 (0.472)***
Eldest Child 0.559 (0.305)* 0.234 (0.285) 0.058 (0.288) 0.349 (0.302) 0.048 (0.282) 0.235 (0.297) 0.126 (0.286) 0.255 (0.284) 0.225 (0.284) 0.45 (0.29) 0.693 (0.303)** 0.199 (0.286)
Urban Background -0.651 (0.098)*** -0.421 (0.091)*** -0.37 (0.093)*** -0.465 (0.102)*** -0.425 (0.092)*** -0.457 (0.101)*** -0.488 (0.094)*** -0.428 (0.091)*** -0.408 (0.091)*** -0.381 (0.092)*** -0.503 (0.107)*** -0.43 (0.092)***
Middle Class -0.141 (0.153) -0.301 (0.144)** -0.248 (0.146)* -0.29 (0.149)** -0.332 (0.142)** -0.264 (0.147)* -0.333 (0.144)** -0.247 (0.146)* -0.33 (0.143)** -0.237 (0.145)* -0.333 (0.164)** -0.324 (0.145)**
Religious Practice 0.041 (0.048) 0.042 (0.046) 0.055 (0.046) 0.091 (0.05)* 0.052 (0.046) 0.099 (0.049)** 0.072 (0.046) 0.048 (0.046) 0.056 (0.046) 0.033 (0.046) 0.137 (0.049)*** 0.07 (0.049)
Membership Index 0.073 (0.039)* 0.08 (0.037)** 0.11 (0.037)*** 0.096 (0.04)** 0.117 (0.038)*** 0.093 (0.039)** 0.049 (0.038) 0.072 (0.037)** 0.083 (0.037)** 0.106 (0.037)** 0.13 (0.048)*** 0.08 (0.037)**
Adiyaman -1.869 (0.427)*** -0.848 (0.404)** -1.158 (0.409)*** -1.148 (0.434)*** -0.995 (0.4)*** -1.102 (0.411)*** -0.929 (0.403)** -0.858 (0.404)** -0.599 (0.406) -0.271 (0.43) -1.152 (0.489)** -0.707 (0.412)*
Number Known -0.006 (0.014) -0.007 (0.013) 0.004 (0.013) 0.003 (0.014) -0.012 (0.012) -0.001 (0.013) 0.002 (0.013) -0.008 (0.013) -0.01 (0.013) -0.014 (0.013) 0.009 (0.015) -0.006 (0.013)
C 1.2 (0.799) 1.025 (0.788) 0.75 (0.794) 1.017 (0.828) 1.327 (0.784)* 0.977 (0.82) 1.397 (0.793)* 0.889 (0.79) 1.026 (0.785) 0.052 (0.831) -0.055 (0.92) 0.768 (0.804)
Observations 1990 1990 1966 1843 1910 1786 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990
R
2 0.08 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.2 0.21 0.2 
points than their counterparts.  Older participants and those from urban backgrounds (at a 1 percent 
level of significance) and only children, participants from the middle class, and participants from 
Adiyaman (at a 5 percent level of significance) all assigned fewer anti-social punishment points. 
Looking to the effects of items from the trust survey, a few measures were significant in 
regards to anti-social punishment.  Those who scored higher on the GSS Fair item (at a 5 percent level 
of significance) and the Trust Strangers and the Lend Money items (at a 1 percent level of significance) 
assigned fewer anti-socially punishment points.  Those who scored higher on the GSS Trust and the 
Trustworthiness items (at a 1 percent level of significance), the door unlocked item (at a 5 percent level 
of significance), and the nationalism and against turban items (at a 1 percent level of significance) 
assigned more anti-social punishment points. 
    
5. Conclusion 
The first aim of this study was to compare the similarities and differences between the 
performance of public goods games in the West and in a country of the Muslim world.  In contrast to 
Gachter et al’s 2004 study of Russian students, Turkish participants’ contributions were not 
significantly increased in response to higher scores on the GSS Fair, GSS Help, GSS Index, or Trust 
Strangers measures.  In fact, higher scores on the Trust Strangers measure was insignificantly 
associated with lower contributions.  One trust measure that was significant in the Turkish population, 
but not the Russian population was the Loan Money measure.  Counter intuitively the greater the 
frequency Turkish participants loaned money to their friends, the lower their N1 contributions.   
An additional area of contrast was the effect of socio-economic background on contributions.  
Gachter et al. (2004) found no effect of socio-economic background on contributions in their study of 
Russian participants whereas we found significant effects in this study of Turkish participants.  
According to the results of our study, females made higher N1 contributions whereas Turks, only 
children, and participants from Adiyaman made lower N1 contributions.  Overall, N1 contribution 
levels were higher in Turkey than in Russia (13.866 points and 8.308, respectively).  However, higher 
N1 contributions have been observed in other countries as well (Herrmann et al. 2008).  Furthermore, 
this study confirms the phenomenon observed by Herrmann et al. (2008).  There is a substantial 
degree of both altruistic, but also anti-social punishment in Turkey.  There is significantly more anti-
social punishment here in Turkey than in other Western countries.  While, this study quantitatively 
observes this to be the case and describes the trust attitudes and socio-economic characteristics of 
those who punish anti-socially, it did not explore these participants’ motives.  An interesting question 
for additional research would be to investigate the thought processes and motivations of those who 
punish anti-socially contrasted with those who choose not to punish in this way. 
A second aim of this study was to analyze both contribution behavior and also punishment 
behavior in light of socio-economic and various trust measures.  The results of this analysis are shown 
below in Table 16. 
Certain trends are observed in this table.  From the N1 contributions perspective, a higher 
Female variable increases contributions while higher Turk, Only Child, Adiyaman, and Lend Money 
variables decrease contributions.  From the punishment perspective, higher Trustworthiness, 
Nationalism, and GSS Trust variables increase punishment across the board.  Likewise, the higher the 
GSS Fair, Trust Strangers, Accumulated Earnings, Age, Only Child, and Urban Background variables 
the lower the punishment was across the board.  High scores on the Female, Membership, and 
Against Turban variables were the worst variables from the punishment perspective because they 
each decreased altruistic punishment and increased anti-social punishment.  Higher GSS Help, GSS 
Index, Religious Practice, and Number Known variables all decreased altruistic punishment.  Higher 
Lend Money, Middle Class, and Adiyaman variables all decreased anti-social punishment wheras 
higher Door Unlocked and Turk variables increased it.    
Table 16:  The effects of trust attitudes, nationalism, and self-described religiosity as well as socio-
economic characteristics on participant behavior 
1.  N1 Contribution Behavior  (C = 13.866***) 
Increased Contributions (Positive)  Decrease Contributions (Negative) 
o  Female (2.869*)  o  Turk (4.128**) 
o  Only Child (4.705*) 
o  Adiyaman (7.552***) 
o  Lend Money (1.308***) 
 
2.  Free Riding Punishment (C = 5.214***) 
Increased Punishment (Positive)  Decreased Punishment (Negative) 
o  Others’ Contribution (0.072***) 
o  Period (0.166***) 
o  GSS Trust (0.289***) 
o  Trustworthiness (0.427***) 
o  Nationalism (0.287*) 
o  Punished Contribution (0.078***) 
o  Accumulated Earnings (0.028***) 
o  Female (0.455**) 
o  Age (0.4276***) 
o  Only Child (2.299***) 
o  Urban Background (0.303***) 
o  Religious Practice (0.146***) 
o  Membership (0.065**) 
o  Number Known (0.028***) 
o  GSS Fair (0.507***) 
o  GSS Help (0.390***) 
o  GSS Index (0.393***) 
o  Trust Strangers (0.250***) 
o  Against Turban (0.664*) 
 
3.  Anti-Social Punishment 
Increased Punishment (Negative)  Decreased Punishment (Positive) 
o  Punished Contribution (0.036*) 
o  Others’ Contribution (0.040*) 
o  Period (0.308***) 
o  Female (0.903***) 
o  Turk (1.221***) 
o  Membership (0.080**) 
o  GSS Trust (0.561***) 
o  Door Unlocked (0.245**) 
o  Trustworthiness (0.497***) 
o  Nationalism (0.237*) 
o  Against Turban (0.475*) 
o  Accumulated Earnings (0.033***) 
o  Age (0.235***) 
o  Only Child (1.136**) 
o  Urban Background (0.421***) 
o  Middle Class (0.301**) 
o  Adiyaman (0.848**) 
o  GSS Fair (0.275**) 
o  Trust Strangers (0.483***) 
o  Lend Money (0.491***) 
Notes:  All trust variables are normalized and resigned such that higher coefficients indicate more trust.  The estimations were conducted 
using censored Tobit estimation.  Robust standard errors are given in parenthesis.  Female, Ethnicity, Only Child, and Eldest Child are 
dummies.  Urban Background, Middle Class, Religious Practice, and Membership Index are integer values.  Adiyaman is a dummy for the 
corresponding city.  Number known refers to the number of other participants in the session.  Italicized results are trust attitudes, 
nationalism, and self-described religiosity variables which are not associated with the C terms or socio-economic terms given in Table 16.  
For the relevant terms, see Tables 5, 14, and 15. 
* Denotes significance at 10 percent.   
** Denotes significance at 5 percent.   
***Denotes significance at 1 percent. 
The third aim of this study was to compare the effects of development on the cooperative 
behavior of Turkish students.  Using the natural laboratory provided by the differing levels of 
development in Adiyaman and Izmir, we were able to examine the effects development had on both  
N1 contributions as well as altruistic and anti-social punishment.  Several trends were identified in 
both contribution behavior and punishment behavior.   
In regards to contribution behavior, the participants in Izmir contributed significantly more in 
the N1 period (12.144*** in Izmir versus 8.55*** in Adiyaman).  These differences are more striking 
when you compare the frequencies of certain N1 contributions.  In the N1 period, 50% of Adiyaman 
students contributed 5 points or less compared with only 29% of Izmir students.  Likewise, 25% of 
Izmir students contributed a full 20 points in the N1 period compared with only 10% of Adiyaman 
students.   
Izmir participants were significantly more sensitive to free riders than were Adiyaman 
participants.  During the N-experiment, the contributions of Izmir participants decreased by 0.833*** 
points per period whereas the contributions of Adiyaman participants decreased by less than half that 
amount (only 0.34*** points per period).   
In regards to punishment, several observations can be made.  Altruistic punishment led to 
greater next round contributions for both Adiyaman and Izmir.  Interestingly, the greater the 
punishment received was, the smaller the next round increased contribution.  Similarly, anti-social 
punishment led to decreased next round contributions for both Adiyaman and Izmir, but oddly the 
greater the punishment was for Izmir, the smaller the next round decrease.  Both altruistic punishment 
and anti-social punishment were of greater frequency in Izmir  compared to Adiyaman.  While there 
weren’t significant differences in the magnitude of altruistic punishment between Adiyaman and 
Izmir, anti-social punishment was 0.667*** points lower in Adiyaman compared to Izmir.  Finally, 
comparing the average earnings change from N- to P-experiments, Adiyaman’s average earnings 
decrease is less than Izmir’s average earnings decrease (48.75% and 66.67% respectively) reflecting 
lower levels of resource destruction through anti-social punishment. 
These observations paint a picture of Adiyaman as a more temperate place than Izmir.  Both 
contributions and punishment were less frequent and less severe (at least anti-social punishments 
were) in Adiyaman than they were in Izmir.  These findings contrast with the previous observations 
that more Western, developed places are associated with lower incidence of ant-social punishment.  
Within Turkey, in this study, the opposite was found:  mainly, that more Western and developed 
Izmir exhibited greater amounts of anti-social punishment. 
When people take a risk for the benefit of the community, whether in contributions to a public 
goods game or in discussions with authorities regarding elephant problems, a certain level of 
reciprocity is expected.  A lack of this reciprocity often leads to decreased risk taking in the group 
and/or self-regulation.  However, self-regulation in the form of punishment contains the risks of a 
double-edged sword.  While it can be used for good to punish free riders, it can also be used anti-
socially to punish the cooperators as well.  This study has confirmed both of these phenomena to be 
present in Turkey. 
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